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In an article published in 1975, we examined the economic and ad-
ministrative aspects of various approaches to the problem of "preda-
tory pricing" under section 2 of the Sherman Act,' and proposed that
legal tests for predation be based on a limited number of cost-based
rules.2 Subsequently, Professors Posner and Scherer raised various ob-
jections to our proposed rules.3 An amplified version of our analysis,
containing a summary of our responses and some relatively minor
modifications of our initial proposals, appears in our antitrust
treatise.
4
Professor Williamson, in a recent issue of this Journal,5 also takes
issue with us by defining predatory pricing through a complex set of
rules that, he claims, would both enhance social welfare and be easier
to administer. The main novelty, and the one for which he most
strongly claims welfare and administrative superiority, is his proposal
that "dominant firms" be prohibited, for a specified time period, from
expanding output in response to new entry.
Williamson's supporting analysis is interesting and provocative, but
ultimately unconvincing. We can state briefly the main points. First,
Williamson and our other critics do not disagree with us about the
danger that predatory pricing claims will be used to stifle legitimate
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
2. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975).
3. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 191-92 (1976); Scherer,
Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1976).
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(1977).
1337
The Yale Law Journal
price competition and to require a price umbrella over inefficient
producers. Second, although Williamson's article focuses mainly on his
proposed output-limiting rule, he seems to recognize that most real-
world claims of predatory pricing can sensibly be analyzed only by
comparing the price to the costs of the alleged predator. Third, al-
though Williamson does, to be sure, insist on a "full cost" price floor
in several instances, he does not satisfactorily distinguish such instances
from those in which he joins us in recommending a marginal- (or
variable-) cost price floor. Nor are his cost tests any easier than ours to
apply. Fourth, within the limited arena where the Williamson output
rule would apply, it rests on a questionable theoretical and empirical
foundation, and as formulated seems hardly administrable at all.
We elaborate these points by (I) summarizing the contending posi-
tions, (II) assessing the output-limitation rule, and (III) analyzing the
differences between Williamson's cost-based rules and our own.
I. The Respective Positions
We have defined predation in terms of short-run marginal cost
(SRMC): prices below SRMC are predatoryO and prices above it are
not. Because SRMC is often hard to identify, we proposed reasonably
anticipated average variable costs (A VC) as a useful surrogate, but with
two important practical qualifications. First, we suggested that reason-
able disputes in defining which costs are "variable" be resolved by
somewhat arbitrary rules; and, for reasons stated in our treatise, we
concluded that most disputed items should be assigned to the variable
cost category when dealing with alleged predatory pricing by a monop-
olist. 7 Second, since A VC ceases to be a reasonably useful surrogate
for SRMC for firms operating beyond optimal capacity, we suggested
that a defendant monopolist be allowed to rely on A VC only when he
offers some evidence indicating that A VC is not significantly below
SRMC. 8 We emphasize that ours is an SRMC standard. Even a price
exceeding full or average cost (A C), which includes imputed capital
costs, can be unlawful, although we would presume it lawful in the
absence of a showing that SRMC is significantly higher. We emphasize
that AC and A VC are used and adjusted and made the subject of
6. Room is left for "promotional" pricing by nonnionopolists. 3 ANrI-RusT LAw 716.
7. Id. 715c.
8. Id. at 176. Although Williamson would not have seen our treatise when lie wrote
his article, these qualifications do address some of his objections to an A VC test. See
Williamson, supra note 5, at 310-12, 333 n.122, 337 & n.129.
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presumptions only in order to obtain an approximation of SRMC.9
Because the SRMC standard is the essence of our approach, it is so
identified for the remainder of our discussion.
There are four major reasons supporting our position. First, preda-
tory pricing rules must take into account the proclivity of competitors
to challenge a rival's price cuts, particularly when the rival is a larger
firm. The threat of litigation may therefore materially deter legitimate
competitive pricing. Second, pricing at SRMC is the result in competi-
tive markets, and has the social welfare virtue of avoiding wasteful
idling of current productive resources. Third, rules requiring price
floors higher than SRAIC will tend to preserve inefficient rivals or
attract inefficient entry. Fourth, elimination or exclusion of rivals may
in some instances cause long-run welfare losses that exceed the short-
run gains from fuller use of capacity, but such long-run consequences
cannot feasibly be incorporated into legal rules because they are in-
trinsically speculative and indeterminate.
Professor Williamson appears to agree with the preceding proposi-
tions,' 0 but, relying on other considerations, he proposes differing cost-
based rules for illegality. With the exceptions of (1) market-clearing
prices for "generational equipment" (already produced and held in
stock),"1 (2) "occasional price wars of very limited duration" among
established firms,' 2 (3) promotional prices of "very short duration in
conjunction with the sale of nondurable consumer goods,"'" and (4)
prices above A VC under conditions of chronic excess supply in
"declining industries,"' 4 Williamson requires all firms to charge at
least a "cost-recovering" price. Distinctions are drawn between the in-
termediate and the long run. Williamson's justification for his partic-
ular cost-based rules is rather sketchy. The bulk of his attention and
analysis is devoted to an output-limitation rule that condemns as
9. One must, of course, welcome further thought about practical ways to improve that
approximation.
10. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 5, at 289 ("It is crucial to make the distinction
between protecting competitors and protecting competition. Sentiment is a cruel hoax if
it leads to protecting competitors, since the consumer is invariably the loser when such
rules are introduced."); id. at 290 ("Marginal cost pricing on a continuing basis has the
optimality properties to which Areeda and Turner refer."); id. at 289 n.20 (marginal
cost can be poor indicator of efficiency, but only "sometimes" and "infrequently"); id.
at 288 n.16 (agrees that long-run possibilities " 'are intrinsically speculative and in-
determinate'" (quoting Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89
HARy. L. REV. 891, 897 (1976)). Williamson does contend, however, that short-run
marginal-cost pricing is suspect when employed against new entrants. Id. at 290, 292-93.
11. Id. at 315-21.
12. Id. at 336.
13. Id. (Rule 3).
14. Id. at 322-23.
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predators "dominant" firms (or members of a "collusive oligopoly")
that "expand their (demand adjusted) output" within twelve to eight-
een months of "new entry."'1
Making certain assumptions regarding the "strategic" behavior of
dominant firms facing the threat of new entry, 6 Williamson contends
that his output rule would induce dominant firms to charge less and
sell more before entry than any cost-based rules would, and for that
reason would also lead to lower aggregate production costs after entry.
He also believes that his output rule would be easier to administer. To
those claims we now turn, leaving to a later section our comments on
Williamson's cost-based rules.
II. Output Limitation
The administrative difficulties in using Williamson's output-limita-
tion rule are very severe, as we shall show. First, however, we shall
examine the contribution that a predatory pricing rule can make to
maximizing pre-entry output by a dominant firm and to minimizing
aggregate post-entry production costs.
A. Pre-Entry Output and Post-Entry Costs
Limiting post-entry output would, on Williamson's assumptions, in-
duce greater pre-entry output than would cost-based rules. But his
analysis suffers from two serious defects. First, his own rule stands con-
demned by the very reasons he gives for rejecting a "price main-
tenance" rule-which would, on his assumptions, induce even greater
pre-entry output than his output limitation rule. Second, he all but
concedes that cost-based rules are superior when actual behavior is not
substantially as he assumes it. In fact, however, his behavioral assump-
tions seem highly questionable.
1. Welfare Analysis on Williamson's Assumptions: Output, "Price-
Maintenance," and Cost-Based Rules Compared
Any predation rules that allow output expansion after entry have
the deficiency of permitting a dominant firm to deter entry with a
lower pre-entry output (and higher price) than the firm would need
under more restrictive rules. For this reason, there is something to be
said for a rule inducing a dominant firm that wishes to deter entry to
take the socially beneficial course of expanding pre-entry output.
15. E.g., id. at 331-35.
16. Id. at 292-93.
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An output limitation rule would produce higher pre-entry output
than any cost-based rules if one assumes, as Williamson does, that
dominant firms faced with a threat of entry will build a "plant" of such
a size that any new entrant would barely cover costs, earning zero
profits, if the dominant firm responded to entry in the most aggressive
manner allowed by the prevailing rule. t7 On this assumption, the more
restrictive the rule on post-entry response, the larger would be the
dominant firm's pre-entry plant and output and the lower would be the
aggregate cost of post-entry output should entry nevertheless take
place.'
It is in these respects that a post-entry output limitation rule would
be superior to a short-run marginal cost (SRMC) rule, an average cost
(A C) rule, or a pure average variable cost (A VC) rule. In an ascending
degree, these cost rules would allow post-entry output expansion and
would thus permit the dominant firm with low output (and high
prices) before entry to expand production and thereby force the post-
entry price down to the zero-profit point for the new entrant.
Williamson's assumption makes clear, however, that an even greater
restriction on post-entry behavior by the dominant firm would induce
even greater pre-entry output. One might compel the dominant firm to
maintain or restore the pre-entry price, which it could do only by
reducing its output to offset the output added by the new entrant.
Applying Williamson's assumptions, this rule would induce the
dominant firm to expand pre-entry output to the point where the price
would barely cover the new entrant's costs. This would be a higher
pre-entry output than that induced by the less restrictive output-limita-
tion rule.19
17. Id. at 294.
18. The explanation for the latter effect is rather technical. See id. at 300-01, 309-10.
In essence, it is attributable to the fact that, on Williamson's assumptions, a dominant firm
would build a somewhat smaller pre-entry plant if it can expand output after entry;
consequently, post-entry output expansion would be at relatively high marginal cost.
19. Indeed, on Williamson's further assumption that any entrant has access to the same
long.run cost curve, id. at 295 & n.36, the dominant firm would set pre-entry price at
the competitive minimum-cost level. If it seems irrational for a dominant firm to forgo
all monopoly profits in order to forestall entry, then Williamson's "limit-pricing" assump-
tion is questionable. We so point out at pp. 1343-45 infra.
There is a technical oddity with a price-maintenance rule. Under an output limitation
or cost-based rules, a dominant firm could set pre-entry output at such a level that no
entrant could even recover costs at the lower post-entry price that its added output
would produce. With a price-maintenance rule in effect, however, it might appear that
the dominant firm would have to set price below minimum costs to deter a firm that
would be satisfied to break even from coming in at most efficient scale (because the
dominant firm must reduce his output to maintain the pre-entry price). Realistically,
however, the new entrant would or could lose money for two reasons. First, the dominant
firm could not be expected to anticipate the new entrant's output, but only to respond
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Without discussing this point, Williamson rejects a price-main-
tenance rule because it requires dominant firms to hold up a "price
umbrella" and would be "an invitation for inefficient firms to enter";
he considers the inferior welfare properties of a rule with these con-
sequences "obvious." 20 Yet an output limitation is also a price umbrella
that induces inefficient firms to enter-less so than a price-maintenance
rule but more so than cost-based rules that permit some output ex-
pansion by the dominant firm and thus a greater downward pressure
on post-entry price.
21
The dilemma, which Williamson does not appear to have con-
fronted, is that no one of these various rules can at the same time both
maximize pre-entry output and minimize the inducement to inefficient
entry. In terms of these effects, the alternative rules can be ranked as
follows, with a low number indicating superiority:
Discouraging
Inefficient Inducing Higher
Rule Entry Pre-Entry Output
1. AVC 1 5
2. AC 2 4
3. SRMC 3 3
4. output limitation 4 2
5. price maintenance 5 1
In short, one cannot determine which rule is superior on balance
without assessing the probable effects of predation rules on (1) dom-
inant firms' pre-entry output decisions, and (2) the likelihood of in-
efficient entry. If Williamson's assumption is correct that dominant
firms will usually adjust pre-entry capacity and output to make entry
unattractive, and if such action will usually deter inefficient entry,
to a price fall resulting from the latter's added output by reducing his own output. Thus
the new entrant would confront prices intermittently below but never above costs, and
full costs could not be recovered. Second, no one would seriously propose that the price-
maintenance rule be enforced for more than a limited period of time, for reasons
Williamson gives in limiting his output rule to a 12-18 month period. See Williamson,
supra note 5, at 296. And if the rule were so limited, any potential new entrant would
realize that it would be extraordinarily risky to enter where the dominant firm already
has the capacity to supply market demand at the competitive price. Such entry would
create excess capacity, and competitive pricing after the lapse of the price-maintenance
rule would drive price below full costs. This again undermines the validity of William-
son's "limit-pricing" assumption, for reasons elaborated at pp. 1343-45 below.
20. Williamson, supra note 5, at 296 n.39, 328 n.ll0.
21. Furthermore, as Williamson himself notes, cost-based rules are a greater deterrent
to potential entry because they create greater uncertainties than an output rule. Id. at 312.
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then his output limitation rule is superior to cost-based rules but in-
ferior to the price-maintenance rule he rejects. 22
We agree with Williamson that a price-maintenance rule is un-
tenable. But we also believe that Williamson's assumptions are too
shaky to support his output rule. To those issues we now turn.
2. Williamson's Assumptions Analyzed
Williamson assumes that a dominant firm's pre-entry price and out-
put decisions will be conditioned (a) by the threat of entry and (b) by
the legal rules governing post-entry response.
a. "Limit Pricing"
Williamson assumes that virtually every dominant firm faced with
the threat of entry will "limit" its price below the short-run profit-
maximizing level in order to discourage new entry that could erode
its market share. He recognizes that dominant firms might behave
otherwise, but dubs such behavior "myopic," "massively unsophis-
ticated," and hence highly improbable.
23
To the contrary, "short-run" profit-maximizing can be entirely
rational even if it attracts entry. Profits earned now are worth more
than profits earned in later years. A dominant firm would not charge
a lower "limit" price unless its estimated discounted income stream
over time from supplying the current share of the market at the lower
price would exceed that from initially higher but later lower returns
from a reduced market share. Thus, even assuming perfect knowledge
of future cost and demand conditions, short-run profit-maximizing may
be the economically rational course.
For example, limit pricing would probably make sense only where
the dominant firm has a significant and relatively durable cost or
product advantage over any potential entrants, or where there are
significant economies of scale.24 Otherwise, it could deter entry only
by charging a competitive (or close to competitive) price, with an
investment in capacity sufficient to supply the greater demand at that
price, and by earning only competitive (or close to competitive) returns.
Such a limit price would sacrifice the monopoly returns that could
22. Cf. note 19 supra.
23. Williamson, supra note 5, at 304 & n.59.
24. "If newcomers can enter the market at small scales . . . at unit costs comparable
to those of the monopolist, the monopolist or dominant firm is unlikely to possess any
short-run pricing strategy option by which it can rationally deter such entry." Scherer,
supra note 3, at 870-71.
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otherwise be earned until new entry reduced price to competitive
levels; there would be little or no compensating gain unless (i) a higher
price would induce excessive new entry that reduced price below
average costs and (ii) the resulting losses would exceed the interim
monopoly profits. The latter conditions seem relatively unlikely. More
generally, the lower the cost advantage in relation to the differential
between the short-run profit-maximizing price and the entry-forestal-
ling price, and the longer it takes for new entrants' capacity to become
operational, the less likely it is that limit pricing would be a rational
policy.
When future demand and cost conditions are uncertain, as they
always are, the attractiveness of limit pricing declines even further.
Short-run monopoly profits are much more certain than long-run mo-
nopoly profits. Long-run profits are subject to contingencies beyond the
firm's control. Costs may rise or demand may fall. The monopolist may
be largely or wholly displaced by a new rival with a much cheaper
production technique or a much superior product. The monopolist
who engages in limit pricing may never get the long-run profits he had
hoped to earn by sacrificing profits in the short run.
In short, dominant firms may or may not engage in limit pricing,
depending on the circumstances. As far as we know, there is no persua-
sive empirical evidence that limit pricing is more probable than not,
and skepticism seems warranted.
2 5
b. Effect of Predation Rules on Limit Pricing
A dominant firm's decision whether to engage in limit pricing will
be affected by the rules governing its post-entry conduct. What it can
do in response to entry will affect post-entry profits and hence the
calculus of whether or not pre-entry limit pricing will pay off. To
acknowledge an effect on that calculus, however, is not to say whether
or how much a more restrictive post-entry rule (such as an output limit
or price freeze) would affect the probabilities of limit pricing in the
generality of cases, as compared with a less restrictive rule (such as the
SRMC price floor). And there is little reason to believe that the effect
25. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 224-25
(1970) ("[W]e lack comprehensive evidence on how frequently producers consciously at-
tempt to control the rate of entry through their pricing decisions.") The critical problem
with attempting to prove that firms have engaged in limit pricing is that prices below
short-run profit-maximizing levels may be due not to entry threats but to present competi-
tive forces, including close substitutes, or to firms' pursuing a "sales-maximizing" rather
than a "profit-maximizing" policy; and economic analysis has been unable to disentangle
the "causes" from objective market data. The problem is particularly acute with oligop-
olists, but exists with dominant firms as well. On limit pricing generally, see id. at 219-36.
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would often be important. For one thing, the SRMC floor does not
differ greatly from the output limit where, as is often the case, SRMC
rises steeply as output nears that at which short-run A C is minimized.2 6
But the problem runs deeper. Williamson would limit output only for
twelve to eighteen months, because "a longer period would pose severe
administrative problems and weaken the incentives of new entrants
quickly to achieve cost parity with the dominant firm.' 27 Thereafter
the dominant firm would be free to expand output to the point at
which price covered average costs. 28 In the interim, it apparently would
be free to expand capacity and thus position itself to expand output,
after the limitation period, at minimum average costs. At that point,
the dominant firm could drive out any new entrant who had come in
at an inefficiently small scale, even though the entrant had by then
overcome "learning curve" and other start-up disadvantages.
The question, then, is how likely is it that any potential entrant who
would not otherwise come in would be enticed to enter by a twelve- to
eighteen-month restriction on the dominant firm's output expansion. If
unlikely, as we suppose,2 9 the dominant firm would have little reason
to respond to a twelve- to eighteen-month output rule by expanding
pre-entry output and capacity.
In short, the dilemma in selecting among predation rules has re-
appeared. In attempting to avoid the welfare costs and administrative
difficulties caused by imposing prolonged output restrictions on dom-
inant firms, Williamson has severely reduced the claimed beneficial
pre-entry output effects of his output restriction rule.
B. Administrative Considerations
Williamson contends that his output rule would be "eminently"
easier to enforce than a variable cost rule.30 We believe the reverse to
be true. The difficulties with an A VC rule are exaggerated, and those
with an output rule are eithee'understated or overlooked.
26. Scherer describes this as the "more realistic case." Scherer, supra note 3, at 881.
It is apparently the rule in continuous process industries, and may appear even in produc-
tion line industries where extra shifts incur higher wage costs. Moreover, Williamson
would not in fact freeze the dominant firm's output, but would permit it to produce 10%
above a trended projection of demand, see Williamson, supra note 5, at 305-06-thus
further reducing the difference between the two rules.
27. Williamson, supra note 5, at 296.
28. See Williamson's rules for established firms, id. at 336-37, which we assume apply
to dominant firms after the 12-18 month period because he states no others.
29. We exclude the rare case where the entrant's capital facilities have a useful life
shorter than the grace period.
30. Williamson, supra note 5, at 305-06.
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1. Average Variable Costs vs. "Demand Adjusted Output"
There are no doubt disputable questions as to (i) which costs should
be included in variable costs, (ii) proper accounting valuation of in-
ventories, and (iii) allocations of costs in multi-product enterprises. The
first can be resolved by more or less arbitrary decisions.31 The second
has no apparent relevance to variable costs of current production.Y'2 The
third should not be difficult where the firm has had consistent ac-
counting treatment of cost allocations over a substantial period of
time. A firm is unlikely to have rigged the treatment in anticipation of
future predatory pricing on one (which?) product-to load the figures
favorably for predatory pricing on one product is to load them un-
favorably for other products, and significant rigging should be more
or less readily detectable. Room for litigation remains, of course, but
Williamson's output test is no more readily applied, wholly apart from
the fact that he also subjects the dominant firm to an A VC price
floor.33 Moreover, the concessions he makes to simplify enforcing the
output rule may well eviscerate it.
Williamson's rule does not limit the dominant firm to its pre-entry
output but to "demand-adjusted" output, which may be greater or
less than pre-entry output depending on post-entry changes in de-
mand. 34 This test requires a demand forecast, which Williamson thinks
would be relatively easy to make.35 Not so. He first suggests that the
test is especially simple for products sold in many separate geographic
markets: "Since only one or a few of these submarkets are apt to
occasion claims of predation, the test is whether output in the suspect
markets has increased disproportionately."3 This is delusive. Demand
changes commonly will vary in different geographic markets, and a
disproportionate output increase in one of them cannot be determined
without determining that there had not been a disproportionate in-
crease in "reasonably forecast" demand. To make the determination,
31. See 3 ANTITRUST LAW , 715c, at 172-74.
32. Our rules apply to current production rather than current sales, and thus inventory
valuation of final product is not necessary.
33. Williamson, supra note 5, at 333 (Rule 1.1).
34. We assume Williamson uses "output" to mean "sales," as he refers to products
"sold" in various geographic markets and "trended average of recent sales." If so, how-
ever, it may be noted that Williamson's rule would permit a dominant firm to build up
inventory during the 12-18 month limit period, thus further enhancing its ability to
displace the new entrant when the restriction ends. And how would goods held in in-
ventory be distinguished from a stock of "generational equipment," which he would
permit any firm to sell at a market-clearing price?
35. Williamson, supra note 5, at 305.
36. Id.
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moreover, one would have to define the various geographic markets,
and we need not recite here the complexities of market definition.
For "other circumstances," Williamson would rely on a "simple
trended average of recent sales," and would permit a "ten percent
allowance over the trended projection" in computing the output
limitation.3 7 The period for computing the trended average is un-
specified, and the problem has no easy solution. It seems virtually cer-
tain that any fixed period, covering the wide variety of product
markets, would be wrong most of the time and in some instances would
yield wildly implausible results. Yet to leave the appropriate trend-
averaging period up to a case-by-case determination would virtually
destroy predictability and would encourage litigation. The would-be
law-abiding dominant firm could act on a reasonable forecast only at
its peril.
38
Finally, an output limitation rule allowing a ten percent increase in
output over one's best demand forecast may permit actions close to
those typically permitted by an SRMC rule.30
2. Firms Subject to the Output Rule
Williamson confines his output rule to "dominant firm and collusive
oligopoly industries." A dominant firm industry is defined as one in
which "the largest firm has a market share of at least sixty percent and
entry into the market is not easy."40 Collusive oligopoly is undefined;
no tests are suggested for distinguishing between a collusive oligopoly,
which is subject to the output rule, and a "loose oligopoly," which is
not. There are several problems here.
a. Dominant Firm
Market share offers a reasonable preliminary, though not conclusive,
guide to dominance. As a first approximation, some market-share test
may be inevitable in any approach that imposes more severe predation
rules on a "dominant firm" than on others. But market shares are
37. Id. at 305-06.
38. On the other hand, to restore predictability by giving the dominant firm the bene-
fit of any doubts would go far towards eradicating the rule.
39. See p. 1345 supra. Observe, moreover, that it is frequently claimed that predation
occurred not at the time of a new firm's entry but only after the alleged predator lost
significant business to the newer firm. At that point, Williamson's rule would permit the
alleged predator to increase output to the higher pre-entry level (plus all demand growth
in the meantime plus 10%). This may diminish further the occasions on which his rule
would realistically confine dominant firms more than they would be confined by a
marginal-cost floor.
40. Williamson, supra note 5, at 292.
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extremely crude indicators of market power,41 and a sixty percent test
seems much too inclusive. Uncertain as the profitability of limit-pric-
ing behavior may be for a monopolist, it is even more risky for a firm
facing existing rivals accounting for forty percent of the market-rivals
whose competition may erode the future profits necessary to make a
present sacrifice of profits by limit pricing worthwhile. One might, of
course, specify a substantially higher market share, say eighty or ninety
percent, but then the output rule would rarely be applicable.
Williamson endeavors to strengthen the validity of his market-share
test of dominance by adding a further condition that "entry into the
market is not easy." Yet that condition is hopelessly vague; he supplies
no further specification; and economics to date has provided at best
only crude methods of empirically determining the height of entry
barriers.
b. "Collusive" Oligopoly
Williamson's rule would limit output expansion not only by "dom-
inant" firms but also by firms constituting a "collusive" oligopoly. The
extension is questionable on the merits: it seems highly dubious policy
to freeze for twelve or eighteen months whatever rivalry there may be
among established firms. Such a policy, moreover, is not easily ad-
ministered. First, demonstrating that a few firms share monopoly power
is highly complex. "Shared monopoly" would not be shown by tradi-
tional collusion to raise prices, for (i) such collusion implies that the
oligopoly is "loose" enough to be unable to collaborate through
market signals alone, and (ii) raising prices would ordinarily be in-
consistent with the limit-pricing hypothesis. To be sure, one could
define "collusive" oligopoly in terms of concentration ratios, such as
four firms accounting for seventy-five percent or more of a market.
Such concentration measures, however, have serious defects; they are if
anything poorer indicators of market power than large single-firm
market shares.42 And although reliance on them may be inevitable in
many antitrust contexts, one cannot pretend that the identification of
shared monopoly is a simple matter.
Second, Williamson does not say which oligopolists will have their
output controlled. Typically, the top firms in a concentrated industry
will vary materially in size. Suppose, for example, an industry of six
firms with the following market shares: thirty, twenty-two, eighteen,
twelve, ten, and eight. Are all to be restricted? Only the top three?
41. See 2 ANTITRusT LAW 507, at 330; 3 id. 804.
42. The problems are briefly summarized in 3 id. 847.
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Only the top four? There is no clear basis for resolving this case 43 or




Williamson's output-limitation rule is triggered by "new entry,"
which his text discussion takes literally. In fact, however, Williamson
would also restrict output whenever "fringe firms" made a "new in-
vestment," that is, when small "established firms" attempted to ex-
pand.4 5 But he does not explain why society should place a price-output
umbrella over the expansion of "fringe" established firms, which may
not face the particular start-up costs that Williamson stresses for true
new entrants: temporary higher production costs until the new firm
"learns" the business and higher capital costs for the firm with no
track record to give investors confidence in its ability to succeed in that
market.
Nor does Williamson face the administrative problems created by
his proposal. "Fringe firm" is not defined, nor is the amount of "new
investment" that will trigger the output limitation rule. One might
define a "fringe" firm as one with a market share of two percent or less.
But any such arbitrary solution is inevitably unsatisfactory in some
respects. For example, why not shield the expansion of two five-percent
firms confronting a ninety-percent rival? Even if we could identify a
"fringe" firm, how much "new investment" would trigger the output
restriction? Surely not a minor addition to capacity. But even a dou-
bling of capacity by a very small firm should not be the occasion for
preventing a dominant firm's or oligopolists' expansion for twelve to
eighteen months.
A final example further illustrates that Williamson's output rule
lacks the administrative ease he claims for it. Williamson does not
consider how his rule would apply to successive "new entries." His
formulation would impose an output limitation on a dominant firm
for twelve to eighteen months after Firm A "enters," and the limita-
tion would apparently continue for another twelve to eighteen months
when Firm B "enters" late in the first limitation period. This result
43. There is much to be said for letting the smaller two firms expand output in
response to new entry. Their expansion would reduce relative concentration in the market,
and would have relatively minor effects on the new entrant. On the other hand, it would
make little sense to let the 10% firm expand while the 12% firm could not. These points
are simply illustrative.
44. For example, what should be done with the firm whose market share has sub-
stantially declined in the pre-entry period?
45. Williamson, supra note 5, at 292 n.26.
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would seem particularly perverse where there is a succession of in-
efficiently small entries; and the perversity is greatly magnified by
classifying new investments by fringe firms as "new entry."
III. Cost-Based Rules
Williamson's output rule would dispose of few, if any, of the litigated
predatory pricing claims. He therefore proposes an array of predatory
pricing rules resting entirely on a firm's costs. His cost-based rules
apparently govern the behavior of dominant firms and collusive
oligopolists, absent new entry, as well as pricing by other established
firms and new entrants. 46 They sometimes employ A VC and some-
times A C, and differentiate the short run, the "intermediate" run, and
the long run. His rules also distinguish between "normal" demand-
supply conditions and "chronic" excess supply. Application of those
rules would be administratively complex, as we shall show later, and
they are questionable on substantive grounds as well.
A. Marginal (or Variable) Costs vs. Full Costs
Williamson recognizes the merits of a marginal-cost pricing floor
(or its A VC surrogate) with respect to (i) dominant firms not increas-
ing output in the short run, (ii) any firm selling "generational equip-
ment," (iii) "occasional" price-cutting by established firms, and (iv)
markets with "chronic" excess capacity (but apparently only in "de-
clining industries"). He insists on a full cost (A C) floor in all other
cases-short-run A C in the short run and longer-run A C in longer
timespans-including "sustained or frequently recurring" price-cutting
and cyclical declines in demand. The basis for these distinctions is not
apparent, and Williamson does not adequately justify them.
In adopting an 4 VC test, Williamson presumably agrees that an
A VC (or MC) test is superior to an A C test in promoting the full use
of existing fixed resources and in discouraging oligopolistic pricing
4 7
46. Williamson's summary of rules does not track his supporting analyses ill two
respects. The analysis is headed "predatory pricing among established firms." He then
breaks this down into (I) pricing in a "loose" oligopoly under conditions of (a) "stable
demand" and (b) "declining demand"; (2) "early stage growth industries"; and (3)
"promotional pricing." Id. at 321-25. The summary of rules, however, contains none
specifically governing pricing by "collusive" oligopolies in the absence of new entry, and
none specifically directed to "early stage growth industries." We presume that his rules
governing established firms cover both "collusive" and "loose" oligopolies; and that
failure to include "early growth" rules in the summary was an inadvertent omission.
47. He does downgrade the welfare losses from restricted output, noting that the main
effect is a transfer of income from consumers to producers. Williamson, supra note 5,
at 290-91. But that is true of any noncompetitive pricing.
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He also agrees that such a test serves efficiency in declining industries
because it disfavors firms making the greatest additional claims on
labor, material, and other resources. But an A VC (or MC) test has
those desirable properties whenever there is excess capacity, be it oc-
casional, "frequently recurring," cyclical, or secular.
The only basis stated by Williamson for his preference for A C in
those other situations is that A VC (or MC) does not necessarily measure
long-run efficiency accurately because the firm with a less capital-
intensive technology may have higher variable costs but lower average
costs. 48 This possibility cannot carry the weight Williamson puts on it.
The instance he cites involves the unusual case of competition among
alternative transportation modes, such as railroads and trucks. And he
himself observed that "these problems [the differing technology case]
may occur infrequently." 49 There seems little warrant for sacrificing
short-run efficiency gains in the predominant number of cases in order
to preserve the infrequent firms that might be more efficient in the
long run.10
Without good reason to distinguish among various kinds of excess
capacity there would also be no reason to distinguish among short,
intermediate, and long runs, unless one sought to guard against "pred-
atory investment." And perhaps Williamson's demand for a "full cost
recovering" price floor for the long run is so intended. But he discusses
neither the predatory investment issues nor the many difficulties that
inclined us to reject such a prohibition."
B. Administrative Considerations
We have been most emphatic about the practical difficulties of
proving predatory pricing or its absence. Some relatively arbitrary rules
are necessary to minimize administrative difficulties, and further con-
tributions may be made on that score. But Williamson's cost-based
rules are no improvement. Williamson relies on A VC in several in-
stances, and thus faces the same difficulties charged to us. Unfortu-
48. Id. at 321-22.
49. Id. at 289 n.20.
50. One might endeavor to confine the SRAC rule to cases in which efficiency dif-
ferentials of the sort described are present, but Williamson did not suggest that course,
and it would be quite impractical. A firm seeking to determine the rule applicable to it
cannot reasonably be expected to know the AJ'C and SRAC of its competitors.
Moreover, as Williamson himself points out, an AC rule is more permissive than our
MC rule when a dominant firm expands output past the minimum AC level. Beyond that
point AC is below MC, and hence an AC test would give greater latitude to a dominant
firm's effort to harm small rivals. See id. at 337.
51. See 3 ANTITRUST LAW 718, 719b; Areeda & Turner, supra note 2, at 718-20, 722-24.
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nately, moreover, AC is also not easily determined. It involves many of
the same accounting difficulties as A VC. In the multiproduct firm, its
use requires not only the allocation of common variable costs but also
the allocation of "overhead." And, very importantly, an essential com-
ponent of A C is imputed capital cost-or "competitive rate of return"-
and its determination involves extensive theoretical dispute and em-
pirical uncertainty5
2
Furthermore, three of Williamson's rules require that a lawful price
be "cost recovering," which, though not defined, appears to mean long-
run MC or, as a surrogate, AC. The accuracy of the surrogate raises
difficult questions, and direct calculation of long-run MC involves
forecasting uncertainties that neither the alleged predator nor a judge
or jury could readily resolve.
Finally, we point out that our proposals make no distinction between
"intermediate" and "long" run or between "normal" demand condi-
tions and those of "chronic excess supply," nor between "early stage
growth industries' and others. In making such distinctions, William-
son's rules would inject into litigation additional issues that would
elude ready resolution.
Conclusion
Professor Williamson has usefully expanded the scope of the eco-
nomic analysis relevant to appropriate legal rules defining predatory
pricing. He fails, however, to establish that his proposed rules are
superior to ours either in welfare properties or administrability. Even
if his novel output-restriction rule had welfare superiorities-which is
highly doubtful-the administrative complications of adding it to cost-
based rules count heavily against it. In any event, he does not escape
heavy reliance on cost-based rules, and his proposals seem to us to be
inferior to ours both in principle and in administrability.
For aught that we have seen, price-cutting warrants neither a more
complex nor a more severe approach than we have proposed.5 3
52. The problems are summarized in 2 ANTITRUST LAW 508-512.
53. Compare Professor Bork's conclusion that any rules on predatory pricing "would
do much more harm than good." R. BORK, THnE ANTITRUST PARADOX 154 (1978).
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